

AN  
ENQUIRY  
INTO  
THE DOCTRINES  
of  
NECESSITY AND  
PREDESTINATION.  
IN  
FOUR DISCOURSES  
PREACHED BEFORE  
THE UNIVERSITY OF  
OXFORD.

BY  
EDWARD COPLESTON, D.D.  
PROVOST OF ORIEL  
COLLEGE, OXFORD, AND  
PREBENDARY OF  
ROCHESTER.  
LONDON,

5736  
1266

Library of the



College of New Jersey.

Purchased 187

~~XXXX~~ 1412-22

AN  
ENQUIRY  
INTO  
THE DOCTRINES  
of  
NECESSITY AND  
PREDESTINATION.  
IN  
FOUR DISCOURSES  
PREACHED BEFORE  
THE UNIVERSITY OF  
OXFORD.  
WITH NOTES,  
AND  
AN APPENDIX  
ON THE  
SEVENTEENTH ARTICLE  
OF THE CHURCH OF  
ENGLAND.

BY  
EDWARD COPLESTON,  
D.D.  
PROVOST OF ORIEL  
COLLEGE, OXFORD, AND  
PREBENDARY OF  
ROCHESTER.  
LONDON,

PRINTED FOR JOHN  
MURRAY,  
ALBEMARLE-STREET;  
AND JOSEPH PARKER,  
OXFORD.

1821.  
BAXTER, PRINTER,  
OXFORD.

## PREFACE:

A SMALL treatise by the late Mr. Dawson of Sedbergh, published about twenty years ago, suggested to me the leading argument of the FIRST of these Discourses. It is entitled 'The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity briefly invalidated.' The author lays down three axioms, as the foundation of his reasoning.

1. If we make a false supposition, and reason justly from it, a contradiction or absurdity will be contained in the

conclusion.'

2. Every action or exertion voluntarily made is with a design, or in hopes of obtaining some end.

3. All practical principles must either be founded in truth; or believed to be so for the moment that they operate.

From these premises he infers that where the doctrine of necessity is firmly believed, and made use of as a practical principle, *motives cease to operate*. Assuming then that in a future state our faculties will be enlarged,



It was perhaps not the most judicious mode of applying the argument, to suppose the case of *another state* of intellectual progress, in order to exemplify it in its full force. For that is, to assume more conditions than are necessary— and those conditions all open to cavil or objection. It is quite enough for the conclusion aimed at, to apply the argument to human nature *as it actually is*; and the conclusion thus deduced is sufficiently absurd to overthrow the hypothesis.

The development of this



principle so applied is attempted in the earlier part of the FIRST Discourse. But besides this, as an argument of equal authority, and as one *concurrent* in its application, it appeared to me that the *moral* consequences of the hypothesis in question might also be pursued: for the notion of a *moral* agent gifted with mental powers, the *improvement* of which naturally tends, to the weakening or the extinction of moral principle, is an absurdity similar to the former, and equally

conclusive against the truth of the supposition from which it flows—a method of reasoning which I do not recollect to have seen adopted by any writer on a continued plan, although nothing is more common than an occasional reference to the topic, that the theory of necessity excludes the ideas of right and wrong. The establishment of these positions forms the main business of the FIRST Discourse.

In the SECOND Discourse the difficulties arising out











here recommended: and in a NOTE subjoined to this Discourse a full account is given of the Archbishop's argument in his Sermon on Predestination and Foreknowledge; together with a general dissertation upon the mode of reasoning by analogy, and an examination of the objections brought against this principle of interpreting Scripture.

The FOURTH Discourse enters upon the main subject of the Calvinistic controversy, viz. *whether there be few that be*





In the course of this argument frequent mention is made of the *equivocal use of words*, as the great source of error among men. Nothing is more common with argumentative writers than this remark; and yet the full extent of its importance does not seem to be understood, even by those who are aware of its truth: for it continually happens that the same writer who has laid down the caution most distinctly, and has employed it in the solution of a proposed difficulty, is guilty of the fault himself in



about which the question turns, the more liable are we to be deceived by their ambiguity; because they not only excite less attention, but men are unwilling to suppose it possible that they should not exactly understand expressions which are so well established in use, and which are in every one's mouth.

An example of this error is produced in the First Discourse, in the use of the word *true*. People are not aware of the laxity with which this word is employed. We speak of a













logomachy, and to have wasted their strength in endeavouring to grasp a phantom, or in fighting the air.

## DISCOURSE 1:

ACTS 15:18.

KNOWN UNTO GOD ARE  
ALL HIS WORKS, FROM  
THE BEGINNING OF THE  
WORLD.

NEXT to the idea of *power* in the supreme Being, that of his perfect *knowledge* of all that is doing in the world seems to be the first that arises in the mind of

man, however  
undisciplined and  
uninstructed, even before  
any tolerable conception of  
what we call his moral  
attributes is formed. The  
most ignorant person, who  
talks of God's *seeing* every  
thing, and *hearing* every  
thing, never for a moment  
imagines that he sees and  
hears by such organs as we  
possess; or that the use of  
those faculties can be  
impeded in him as it often  
is in ourselves; that  
anything, for instance, can  
be hid from him, or come  
upon him by surprise, or be  
dimly and confusedly



step, but a natural and easy transition, to attribute this faculty in a much higher degree to God—or rather to conceive it as existing in him without any limitation at all. The more general statement indeed, that God does not exist in *time* but in eternity, and therefore that there is no room for the ideas *before* and *after* when speaking of *him*, and that the succession of events cannot to such a Being make any difference, is perhaps beyond the reach of minds not accustomed to such abstraction: but the plainest and most



earliest religious practices of rude nations is to consult the Deity about that which is to come: plainly implying that foresight, which is the strongest evidence of superiority among men, must belong to God in a far more eminent degree. The counsel of Ahitophel was (the sacred historian observes) “as if a man had enquired at the oracle of God.”

The course indeed of the *material* world seems to proceed upon such fixed and uniform laws, that short experience joined to close attention is sufficient















influenced by me. You may if you please contend, that because God made everything, therefore all things that happen are done by him. This is taking another ground for the doctrine of necessity, which will be considered presently. All I maintain now is, that the notion of God's *foreknowledge* ought not to interfere in the slightest degree with our belief in the *contingency* of events, and the *freedom* of human actions. The confusion has, I conceive, arisen chiefly from the ambiguity of the word









harass and perplex many minds, and which, when they assume a certain determinate form and aspect, cause one of the most melancholy corruptions of our faith to which a Christian can be subject. And since the ground on which the doctrine of necessity rests, is the same with that on which the creed of the Calvinist is built, although the latter defends his opinions also by the language of Scripture, and considers that to be his strong hold; yet whatever discredit can be thrown





consider whether the opinion of the Fatalist is reconcilable with other positions which we can prove to be undeniably true.

Now if we cast our eyes on the world as it actually is, we readily perceive that the activity and energy of men is increased by a persuasion that they have it in their power to attain certain ends—and that they never think of attempting that which they know to be impossible, or beyond their reach, or not capable of being obtained or averted

by anything they can do. To be taking measures for procuring a fertile season, or for stopping the mouth of a volcano, would be a certain proof of insanity. Men do indeed often engage in vain and chimerical undertakings, but it is under a belief of their practicability; and as soon as they discover their error they leave off. Ignorant people also will take needless pains to promote those designs which they favour, and which are going on steadily through the agency of other causes. Thus a child or a















examples and authorities in support of this position. The memorable case of the plague of Athens will occur to many of my hearers, in which after the irresistible nature of the visitation was once impressed upon the people's minds, either a stupid despair, or an utter abandonment of all moral and religious principle succeeded. But the fact it is presumed will hardly be denied, that when men really believe, and the belief is present to their minds, that a decree has passed upon them, their own motives to action are



































which his conduct may have before extorted from us. And although in all these cases, as far as the will of the agent can be ascertained to coincide with the orders he executes, whether good *or* evil, we are disposed to ascribe to him some share of the quality of the action, yet in exact proportion to his efficacy in bringing it about, is the praise or the blame which we think justly belonging to him; and the expression of concurrent will on his part inclines us only to regard him with favor or















speculations such as these  
that the world gives the  
name of philosophical  
necessity !

**Vain wisdom all, and false  
philosophy!**

**Yet, with a pleasing  
sorcery, could charm**

**Pain for a while or  
anguish, and excite**

**Fallacious hope, or arm  
the obdured breast**

**With stubborn patience, as  
with triple steel.**

That men should be  
brought to profess  
opinions, so contradictory







The generality of Calvinists when charged with the *consequences* of their opinions, like the Fatalists, answer that we ought to *address* mankind as if their doom were unsettled—as if God were willing that all should be saved—and as if much depended on themselves whether they should obtain salvation or not. And when farther pressed with the *inconsistency* of these opinions they reply, that such exhortations are the *appointed means of perseverance*. Be it so. Then they are means the efficacy







generally overlooked. The doctrines rest indeed on the same basis, but that of Calvinism is practically far more dangerous.

The Fatalist acts in general as other men do. He is not likely to neglect urgent duties, or to endure pain and privation for the sake of an abstract theory. His habits, his interests, his affections, his regard for character and for the opinion of the world, all keep him from being led astray by a speculative absurdity. But whatever security the Calvinist has of this kind is *weakened* by

the very nature of his opinions. According to them he suffers *comparatively* nothing by yielding practically to their force: and their force is exerted in *lessening* the motives of a worldly nature which control the other. The instincts, the appetites, and the interests of the Calvinist, may indeed rouse him to action, although in this respect their influence must be weaker than it is with the mere Fatalist; while the worldly restraints upon vicious indulgence are almost entirely removed. For since the





inducement to betake himself to prayer, or to the worship of the Deity—while he who looks chiefly to another life, and believes his destiny in that life to be fixed and unalterable, may naturally be careless and indifferent about his conduct here.

Thus it is observed of Tiberius, “Circa Deos et religiones negligentior erat, *quippe* addictus mathematicae, perspasionisque plenus, omnia fato agi.”

The remark is made by a philosophical writer, and addressed to a







far as they really operate, it is as natural a conclusion that the Calvinist will be careless about *morals*, as that the Fatalist will be careless about *religion*.

A most remarkable instance of this tendency occurs in the disputes which arose among some of the earliest sufferers for the Gospel's sake in this country; who were confined in the same prison during the persecution in Queen Mary's reign. Pious and conscientious as they all were, their differences on points of doctrine began with a complaint of the

























the Stoical school, and we collect from Cicero, in his treatise De Fato, what the knot was which tied them down to such unnatural opinions.

Every proposition, they said, is either true or false. This is essential to a proposition, and it is universally admitted.

Although therefore I may not know which it is, yet that it is one or the other, and that it is so at the time it is uttered, is certain; and my ignorance does not at all affect the certainty of the proposition. Suppose then I say, “such an event will



assertion respecting the *future* therefore is neither true nor false. And if they press us still farther with the nature of proposition, we have only to reply that it is not a proposition, in that sense of the word proposition above explained, and thus their whole argument falls to the ground. Frivolous as the example appears when exhibited in this simple form, yet whole volumes of perplexing metaphysics have been spun out of these flimsy materials.

*[The equivocal use of the word true is combined*





















been done, or make that contingent which he knows will come to pass, is to contradict one's self. That it is impossible for the same thing *to be* and *not to be* is indisputable. When the meaning of one term of a proposition confessedly implies the negation of the other, it is absurd to dispute about them. Whether life be death, or light be darkness, cannot come into question even among logo-machists. And therefore if we mean by the word *contingent*, that which cannot be known beforehand, we only say,

that what cannot be known beforehand cannot be known beforehand—which is saying nothing—and therefore nothing is denied of the Deity.

But if the subjects and predicates of two apparently incongruous propositions are not precisely identical—if there be any shadow of difference not merely perceptible but possible in their meaning—although we may be incapable of reconciling their apparent incongruity, or of conceiving in what manner the things denoted



be necessary to guard against fallacy in the employment of them. While we confine our attention to the ordinary occurrences of life, or to those relations of things with which we are all familiar, no such precision or refinement is required. The commonest tools need not be made with mathematical exactness. But when we push our enquiries beyond this daily sphere of vision, greater and greater accuracy is requisite in the instruments we employ. The slightest impurities in the atmosphere, a floating atom,

or the vibration from a footstep, will interfere with the observations of physical science—and throw us perhaps at once out of our true course

*Ten thousand  
leagues awry  
Into the devious air.*

And when we take upon us to explore the hidden things of God, those vast regions which lie at an immeasurable distance from our ordinary range of thought, can it be surprising if the instruments which serve us well enough here,











had wandered.'

There yet remain some points to be examined in the argument concerning God's dealings with man, and the freedom and responsibility of man, regarding only the present life, before we shall be prepared to transfer the same method of reasoning to those analogous difficulties which have been started from the language of Scripture, and the removal of which is the ultimate aim of the enquiry thus begun: but the consideration of these must be made the subject of



ii. sect. 12. But infallible foreknowledge, while it remains foreknowledge, *proves* nothing. When the being which possesses this foreknowledge *declares* that a thing will come to pass, that declaration indeed proves, or is a certain ground of assurance to us, that it *will* come to pass. Even then it does not prove the *event to be necessary*.

This is an example of the same error which pervades the Stoical argument above mentioned, in the treatise De Fato—i. e. confounding *words* with *things* One







quality in the nature of the things foreknown, is even less excuseable than to be guilty of that confusion when speaking of ourselves.

## **DISCOURSE 2:**

DEUT. 8:5.

THOU SHALT ALSO  
CONSIDER IN THINE  
HEART, THAT AS A  
MAN CHASTENETH HIS  
SON, SO THE LORD THY  
GOD CHASTENETH  
THEE.

THE point which I  
endeavoured to establish in











been abused. Although in this respect at least the proceeding is more rational than the creed of the Necessarian, inasmuch as the enquiring party implies that we must go *out of* nature to seek for that, which is so abhorrent to the very constitution of nature itself.

The next difficulty which I suppose may be objected to the opinions we maintain is, that they are inconsistent with the language habitually employed by religious men to denote their sense of the

















the notion of a supreme intelligence planning, governing, guiding, and accomplishing the whole? or can such a conception in the mind of man of the scheme of divine Providence tend to relax his energy, to discourage his industry, to impair the distinctions of right and wrong, or weaken the principle of duty and obedience?

The only argument brought against it is borrowed from the difficulty of accounting for *evil* as mixed with God's

creation, and of conceiving free-will in his creatures. But *difficulties* can never be listened to against the evidence of facts. The fact of the existence of evil no one denies—and the existence of free-will is, by the concurrent unreflecting testimony of all mankind admitted to be a fact, opposed only by the metaphysical objections of a few. That all mankind act, speak, and think, as if the will were free, is admitted by these few themselves. And I trust it may be regarded as proved, that to think otherwise would



proposed idea negatives the other, the thing may be called impossible: although in this case it would be more correct and more safe to use the word *contradictory* than impossible: because it is with us—with our mode of speaking and combining ideas—that the difficulty both begins and ends: the power of God is not denied or limited by these negations. Thus if I were called upon to make a circle whose radii should be unequal, or whose diameter should be one-fourth of the circumference, it would







small a part of God's works, both in extent and in duration, our faculties can embrace, and further, how intimately and variously connected all the parts of those works are, plainly indicating one scheme, of which the remotest parts have numerous and complicated relations with each other, so that much of what we see is essential to what we do not see, and to suppose, one without the other would be a contradiction in terms as literal, though not so palpable, as a circle with unequal radii— when, I say,





conclude with regard to all questions in which the infinite power of God is represented as being irreconcilable with something that either is, or is alleged to be—that unless an actual contradiction can be pointed out in the terms of the proposition, no difficulties can justify a denial of its possibility—and on the other hand, that many of those things which fill us with difficulty to account for, are necessary conditions to other things the existence of which we assume, and could not

without involving a contradiction have been otherwise. So that what we first thought to be *impossibilities*, turn out to be only *difficulties*—and, on the other hand, many of the *difficulties* which perplex us in the scheme of Providence are such, that the removal of them, keeping other things as they are, would be an *impossibility*.

Let us return then to the consideration of the actual scheme of God's providence on earth, as we learn it by experience; and















charity, which are perhaps the most efficacious towards our own improvement, and towards fitting us for the enjoyment of a higher state of being. And though we presume not to say how much or how little of these modes of trial may be requisite for the perfection of our nature, yet reason at once informs us, that without such trial the principles of our nature would have no exercise; and therefore that some temporary deviations from the general law of equity are essential to the discipline and probation of







sense of our dependence upon him, must be a part of our business here. Prayer and meditation on his attributes are the obvious means of effecting this—and accordingly it is a universal practice, wherever any sense of religion is entertained among men. In the mode of preferring their petitions, as well as in the things they pray for, a thousand differences and a thousand errors prevail: but in all cases the act itself implies a belief that the Deity is not inflexible, and that things are not absolutely so





preservation of this sense of dependence on God, by the need which is continually felt of recurring to his protection and indulgence.

This habit however is also liable to *its* perversion and abuse. And accordingly we find that ignorant or sanguine people are perpetually interpreting the occurrences of life as special marks of divine favour or displeasure. When applied to the success or the misfortune of others, nothing can be more reprehensible or more unchristian than this

practice—and though less pernicious in our own case, yet since it breeds a narrow notion of God's providence, and borders close both upon presumption and superstition, there is often need of correcting and chastening it, by turning men's attention to the settled order of things, by which these events may be accounted for without the aid of any particular interference of divine power. In proportion as the understanding is cultivated, and our knowledge enlarged, these false impressions are

corrected, and a more sober and rational sense of religion succeeds to them.

Let not the Necessarian attempt to retort on us the argument already employed in refutation of his scheme, namely, that if the more we know of nature the less prone we are to interpret natural events as particular acts of Providence, then *we* also admit, that in proportion as reason is cultivated our natural judgments are counteracted. The two cases are widely different. In *his* case it is not sudden

and early *impressions* that are required to give way to a more abstract and philosophical view of things, but our gravest and most deliberate *judgments*, the foundation of all our plans and proceedings in life, of all our motives to action, and of all our moral discipline. In the case of the untutored Indian, who

**Sees God in clouds,  
or hears him in the  
wind,**

or of the peasant, who interprets every natural event which at all affects







under the guidance of the light of nature was very general. “That every good and every perfect gift is from above,” is a sentiment not *introduced* but *adopted* by an Apostle of Christ. It occasionally breaks through the gloom of the philosophy and the religion of the heathen world: and the sublimer strains of their poetry speak the same language. That God favours those who yield to his influence— but that he rejects and abandons or drives on headlong to their ruin men who resist his will—are frequent

exclamations of those who contemplate with an awful wonder his moral government of the universe. That these wicked and rebellious men, when they fancy they are pursuing their own schemes, are baffled and foiled, and made subservient to those very purposes which they endeavour to defeat—that they are raised aloft in order to render their fall more exemplary—that they are flattered for a time with the apparent success of their iniquity, in order that the punishment when it



begin to enquire whether the world might not have been constructed otherwise, whether evil might not have been dispensed with, whether what God foreknew can be said to proceed from the free will of man, and whether he must not be understood as having preordained every occurrence however minute or however iniquitous which takes place in the world, it is no wonder that their enquiries should be lost in endless mazes, or in a denial of something which it is as necessary to



*consequences* from each of those fundamental positions separately taken should be deducible, which are no more reconcileable with each other in our apprehensions, than the original truths are from which they are derived. To dwell upon these subordinate truths, these consequences of the original positions, to set them in array against each other, to represent him who holds the one side as necessarily contradicting the other, and to demand an explicit disavowal of every tenet connected with









discrepancies, and to approximate if we cannot identify opinions, instead of assuming that tone of challenge and defiance, which implies that there is no difficulty to be overcome; and that he who will not renounce the one, is justly chargeable with all the pernicious consequences involved in a denial of the other. There may be truths, as there are mathematical lines, which must ever approach, although to the comprehension of a finite being they will never coincide. Such questions

then, which by their very nature cannot admit of a perfect solution, should never be started as proper objects of human investigation. They may be resorted to by the sophist as an inexhaustible storehouse of wrangling and controversy; but he who values discussion only as it tends to elucidate truth, will turn away from that which ministers only debate, satisfied with the possession of those undoubted truths, without which his own existence is a still greater mystery than the deepest of all these



greater and no other than what we might, from a contemplation of the course and constitution of nature, have reasonably expected to find in it—thus confirming instead of weakening, the conviction of their common origin—we shall of course be prepared to find each of those doctrines now considered, which our natural reason has collected from the study of the world around us, plainly and explicitly set forth in that volume which professes to lead us onward to another world. The book

















# DISCOURSE 3:

ACTS 2:23.

HIM, BEING DELIVERED  
BY THE DETERMINATE  
COUNSEL AND  
FOREKNOWLEDGE OF  
GOD, YE HAVE TAKEN,  
AND BY WICKED  
HANDS HAVE  
CRUCIFIED AND SLAIN.

IT has been my endeavour  
in two former discourses to  
demonstrate that the  
doctrine of philosophical  
necessity is not only at  
variance with the evidence  
of consciousness, but that it  
contradicts the soundest









'What flashes of light break out from time to time, present the image of truth on opposite sides.' Why then should not truth itself be really an inmate of each opinion? Unless it can be shewn, which never has yet been shewn, that the two opinions are *contradictory* to each other. That they are contradictory has been tacitly assumed, because to us their union is inexplicable: and hence the most pernicious errors of different kinds have at times prevailed—some denying or doubting the agency of







*certain* and *contingent*, to the human mind, and is expressive of the manner in which we stand affected by such and such objects.

Another important example of the same kind is in the use of the words *possible*, and *impossible*. These are equally ambiguous with the others, as being applied sometimes to events themselves, and sometimes used with reference to our conceptions of them— but of these it is observable that *their primary* and proper application is to events, their *secondary* and

improper to the human mind. Thus we say that a thing is possible to a man who has the *power* of doing it—and that is properly *impossible* which no power we are acquainted with can effect. But the words are also continually used to express *our sense* of the chance there is that a thing will be done. When we mean to express our firm conviction that a thing will not happen, although there are *powers* in nature competent to produce it, we call it impossible, in direct opposition to those things which we are convinced













words.

'An universal providence disposing all events without exception, leaves no room for freedom. But there is such a providence, therefore no freedom: or on the other side, there is a freedom of the will, therefore no such providence. Thus both parties lay down the same major, without which they would make no scruple to admit the minor assumed by their antagonists. But the most sober and considerate part of mankind, induced by the strong evidences both of



















principal end and meaning.

This fault however is not common, at least not with the writers of our own Church. It is with the Predestinarian then that our business chiefly lies; and we complain that he unwarrantably interprets those passages of Scripture which declare that things happen from the appointment and the ordinance of God, from his *purpose*, his *counsel*, his *will*, as if mankind were not at liberty to do otherwise than they have done—and as if he punished them for those acts which he









worketh all things after the counsel of his own will'—and that the eternal happiness or misery of men is the consequence of his absolute decree passed before they were born, even from all eternity.

That God created all things and all men, knowing the minutest point of every man's future conduct, is universally admitted.

**'The Lord hath made all things for himself; yea even the wicked for the day of evil [*Prov. 16:4.*].'**





God.

That *evil* exists, and that God is not the author of it, although the author of everything else, undoubtedly carries with it as great a difficulty as the other question we were considering. We readily perceive that this difficulty arises out of the nature of a *created responsible free agent*, an anomaly among all the objects of our understanding which we can never hope thoroughly to comprehend. We cannot indeed conceive how a being who *knows* all things that will come to pass,



more nearly to that part of man's nature which is thus peculiar and inexplicable, that the difficulty of explaining them by comparison with other things should be increased.

There is nothing in nature which stands in the same relation to us which a *moral free agent* bears to his Creator; and accordingly all the language we employ to denote this relation, being borrowed from our own relation to the things around us, must be partial and imperfect expressions,

never comprehending at once the whole of this complex idea, but exhibiting that portion of it which best accords with the occasion or with the object principally intended—at one time using the comparison of the potter and his clay, to assert God's absolute creative power and disposing providence—at another representing him as exhorting, arguing, expostulating, striving with his creatures, vexed at their perverseness, anxious for their restoration, affording them the means of return,



grieved at their neglect of him, and rejoicing in their recovery. To oppose these passages in hostile array one against the other, has not the slightest tendency to resolve the question. They are all just what by the very nature of the question we might expect to find in Scripture. Even the Deist, who admits the doctrine of a Providence and of Free-will, having accustomed His mind to acquiesce in the mysterious truth, has no pretence for objecting to the *analogous* difficulties involved in the language of







words and forms of speaking applied to the Deity, being borrowed from other objects, cannot adequately describe his nature and proceedings. They are the best means, indeed the only means we have of expressing our thoughts upon this subject at all, but they ought never to be used without a reverential sense of their imperfection—and the rule of interpreting them always as *relative* to ourselves is an admirable preservative against many mistakes and perplexities, into which men are led by a critical

analysis of scriptural terras. It is to teach *us* how to feel and act towards God, not to explain *his* nature that such words are chosen. If he is said to be *angry*—it is that we may feel it our interest to endeavour to please him. If he is described as *unchangeable* - is that we may not indulge the weak imagination of eluding, surprising, or finding him capricious and careless, as *men* often are, forgetful of their purpose, and less peremptory at one time than another. If is said to pity and repent, it is that we may neglect nothing which

we should do in a case of distress to make a *man* pity and repent.

The scholastic rule is no bad one for the interpretation of such language, *Affectus in Deo denotant effectum*. When the *effect* is the same which certain passions would naturally lead to in men, we speak of it as proceeding from the same *cause*: but nothing would be more absurd, as well as impious, than because the name of a certain passion is employed in these cases, to pursue the investigation farther, analysing the elements, the















is employed, as if the purpose merely was to set forth the actual *event*. For example,

**'I am not come to send peace on earth, but a sword [Matt. 10:34.]'**

Does the Calvinist himself understand these words as equally expressive of our Lord's *design*, with that benevolent declaration,

'The Son of man is not come to destroy men's lives, but to save them [Luke 9:56.]?'

Or again, in those

















imposing constraint or necessity on the events themselves, his *declaring* that knowledge makes no conceivable difference. One of the important ends of prophecy is to confirm our faith, and to fill us with an awful sense of the attention with which the Almighty regards human affairs. 'These things have I told you, that when the time cometh, ye may remember that I told you of them.' That the assertions also are free from error, that the prophecy will not fail of being accomplished, we admit—but the







compass of *powers* well known to exist. The same holds good of many other phrases expressive of necessity, by which, if we examine them more closely, we find that nothing like *compulsion* or physical necessity is intended, but merely an intimate connexion and coherence with something else. Thus the dependence of a conclusion on its premises in most languages is denoted by the same terms which express physical necessity: and the close correspondence between a prophecy and its



















seen thy tear's: behold, I will heal thee.'

It may be replied, by way of shewing the difficulty of obtaining such a revocation, that even in this case the alteration of the laws of nature is represented as an easier matter—that the shadow of the sun-dial went back, as an evidence that God's word would thus be recalled. It is not however the *easiness* of this proceeding for which I contend, but its *practicability*. There is a faith which can remove





the good, wherewith I *said* I would benefit them?" [Jer. 18:5]'

The examples of this procedure on the part of the Almighty as revealed in Scripture are not numerous, but they are decisive of the question. 'Yet forty days,' said the prophet Jonah, 'and Nineveh shall be overthrown.' But the whole city repented— 'And God saw their works, that they turned from their evil way; and God repented of the evil that he had *said* that he would do unto them; and he *did* it not.' Surely these









creatures, or to regard it as shackled by any antecedent decrees and declarations, is still more at variance with the proofs he has given, that he *willeth* not that any should perish, and that in every nation he that *feareth* him and *worketh* righteousness, is, through *faith* in the merits of Christ, accepted with him.

### NOTES TO DISCOURSE 3.

A GREAT part of the argument of the preceding Discourse is so nearly coincident with that maintained in the valuable



reasonable disgust of the manner in which topics of that sacred nature are too often handled, and by a disapprobation of many consequences which seemed plausibly enough to be connected with each opinion, when peremptorily maintained. Passages to this effect from the writings of Luther have been already produced. And it appears that our own Reformers, especially Cranmer and Ridley, were of the same opinion.

‘Sudden changes,’ said Ridley, ‘without substantial

and necessary cause, and *the heady setting forth of extremities*, I did never love [*Letter to West, in the Martyr's Letters, p. 40.*].’ As to Ridley, it is clearly proved by Dr. Laurence, in his Introduction to the treatises before mentioned, that Bradford could not obtain from him that approval and sanction which he importunately desired, of his own doctrines on Predestination. Bradford’s tract is written in the high and confident strain of the Calvinistic school. A copy of this he had sent to Ridley

when in prison at Oxford, soliciting at the same time some public declaration of his opinion upon these points. Ridley answered with mildness and moderation—not declining the task for want of leisure, or want of inclination to employ his mind in labours of this kind, but evidently unwilling to pronounce a peremptory opinion upon matters so mysterious, and so far elevated above the sphere of our conceptions. ‘Sir,’ he says, ‘*in these matters I am so fearful, that I dare not speak farther, yea almost none*





2. After the same manner the language of Scripture ascribes hands, feet, and eyes, to God; and although in this case it is universally allowed that the terms are metaphorical, yet the principle of the application is the same as in the former case.

3. Passions also are attributed to God, bearing the same name with human passions, not that we believe God to be really subject to mental perturbation, but because the effects upon mankind are similar to those which are produced by such





helping us only to form some notions, but those faint and inadequate, of his divine perfection.

They are not to be understood then in their literal sense as *direct* and *proper* appellations; and we ought never to pursue these comparisons farther than the occasion on which they are used requires; nor draft positive conclusions from such premises as if the terms were in themselves proper and thoroughly understood. In like manner when speaking of our own minds, because we use the words, *weigh*,

*penetrate, reflect*, which are all expressions borrowed from matter, it would be equally absurd to carry on the comparison into all other particulars of those actions—and to suppose that weighing a thing in our minds must have all the effects, and be accompanied with all the circumstances, that are observable in weighing a body.

The important use made by the author of this doctrine is, 1st, to check presumption and irreverence towards the

Almighty when we converse and reason about these matters; and, 2ndly, to reconcile us to those seeming contradictions in Scripture, which have given birth to angry disputes among Christians, but which, if duly interpreted according to this rule, ought no more to surprise us than when we read in one place of God's *repenting*, and in another that he does *not* repent.

It is impossible to peruse this Sermon without being struck with the candour and moderation of the





unreasonableness of their mutual accusations.

This however will not satisfy a professed controversialist, as Edwards was. He endeavours therefore to prove, that because the Archbishop speaks of the intellectual and moral attributes of the Deity as only known to us by analogy and as being named accordingly, he does in effect resolve the whole of religion into *figure*, and denies the *real nature* of these things as much as he denies bodily parts and passions. According to this

plan, the Church of England might, he says, as well have described God to be without wisdom, knowledge, goodness, and justice, as without body, parts, and passions—and when we have stripped the notion of God of these attributes, and reduced it to *the general cause of all effects*, we are in fact no better than Atheists.

This objection the Author had himself anticipated, and has provided what to many readers will appear to be a sufficient answer. He observes,



‘The common use of figures is to represent things that are otherwise very well known, in such a manner as may magnify or lessen, heighten or adorn, the ideas we have of them. And the design of putting them in this foreign dress, as we may call it, is to move our passions, and engage our fancies more effectually than the true and naked view of them is apt to do, or perhaps ought. And from hence it too often happens, that these figures are employed to deceive us,

and make us think better or worse of things than they really deserve.

But the analogies and similitudes that the holy Scriptures or our own reason frame of divine things, are of another nature; the use of them is to give us some notion of things whereof we have no direct knowledge, and by that means lead us to perception of the nature, or at least of some of the properties and effects of what our understandings cannot directly reach; and in this case to teach us

how we are to behave ourselves towards God, and what we are to do, in order to obtain a more perfect knowledge of his attributes.

And whereas in ordinary figurative representations, the thing expressed by the figure is commonly of much less moment than that to which it is compared; in these analogies the case is otherwise, and the things represented by them have much more reality and perfection in them, than the things by

which we represent them. Thus, weighing a thing in our minds is a much more noble and perfect action than examining the gravity of a body by sale and balance, which is the original notion from whence it is borrowed; and reflection, as in our understandings, is much more considerable than the rebounding of one hard body from another, which yet is the literal sense of reflection. And after the same manner, what we call knowledge and foreknowledge in

God, have infinitely more reality in them, and are of greater moment than our understanding or prescience, from whence they are transferred to him; and in truth these, as in man, are but faint communications of the divine perfections, which are the true original, and which our powers and faculties more imperfectly imitate, than a picture does a man: and yet if we reason from them by analogy and proportion, they are sufficient to give us such a notion of God's

**attributes, as will oblige us to fear, love, obey, and adore him.'**

But as the objection continues to be urged by many who are not infected with the spirit of controversy, and who seriously think that the honour of God is impaired by this explanation, it may be well to examine the question more in detail. Indeed this examination is the more necessary, because the words *analogy* and *resemblance*, about which the whole question









*proceed* with the argument till this is well established: if this were *removed*, the system must fall. The only cautions requisite in the use of this kind of analogy are, FIRST, not to proceed to a comparison of the corresponding terms as they are intrinsically *in themselves* or in their own nature, but merely as they are *relation* to the other terms respectively; and, SECONDLY, not to presume that because the relation is the same or similar in one or two points, therefore it is the same or similar in all.

The **FIRST** of these errors









this similarity of relation holds are of secondary importance—when instead of being essential and characteristic, they are slight and superficial—the analogy is often called a metaphor, and often a similitude, as being addressed rather to the fancy than to the judgment, and intended rather to adorn and illustrate, than to explain. But it would perhaps be better to avoid the name *similitude* in these cases, and to regard them as being, what they really are, *analogies*, although subsisting in







into an analogy are not found in the same classes of existence. Individuals are physical beings —commonwealths are not physical but moral essences.' [*Letters on a Regicide Peace*, p. 4.]

A remarkable example of this kind is that argument of Toplady against free-will, who, after quoting the text *Ye also as lively stones are built up a spiritual house* [1 Pet. 2: 6.], triumphantly exclaims, 'This is giving free-will a stab under the fifth rib: for can stones hew themselves, and build themselves into a





but also bear a close resemblance to each other, then it is we are most apt to confound them together, and to substitute resemblance for analogy. Thus because the heart or the tooth of an animal not only serves the same office to the animal that the heart or the tooth of a man does to him, but is also an object very nearly resembling it in structure and outward appearance, we are apt to imagine that the same name is given to it solely on this last account. But if we pursue the enquiry throughout the animal



the tooth of man, and the shell of a lobster to the bones of other animals. If the use and office remain the same, no diversity of form impairs the analogy: but we ought from such examples to learn even when similitude of form *does* exist, not to regard it as the true ground of the comparison we make, and of our affixing the same name.

Thus too when we speak of *qualities* of things which are not cognizable by our senses except in their effects, we bestow the same name on account of a real







proportion as the *nature* of the respective subjects to which they belong may be regarded as the same.

The SECOND error above noticed as carefully to be avoided in the use of analogy is, when we do not indeed treat the corresponding terms as *resembling one another* in their own nature, but when we presume that a similarity of relation subsists in *other points* besides those which are the foundation of the analogy.

When the analogy consists in slight or



truth actually on their side.

Thus because a just analogy has been discerned between the metropolis of a country, and the heart in the animal body, it has been sometimes contended that its increased size is a disease—that it may impede some its most important functions—or even be the means of its dissolution.

Another frequent example of this *second* error is found in the use of the same titles of office or dignity in different nations or in distant times. Although the relation











an *agent*; but having no word to denote the active cause in him, we borrow the word which belongs to the cause of these effects in men.

Thirdly, when we speak of the *wisdom* and *knowledge* of God, his *justice*, *mercy*, *love*, *long-suffering*, the process is precisely similar to that before described. There are effects continually coming under our notice which indicate these qualities in men, and from a view of *effects* similar to these in the system of the universe we suppose corresponding



serious controversy now arises—and because the qualities here spoken of are such as we esteem and admire among men, it has been thought not only allowable to indulge the notion of their being really *like* to the corresponding qualities in God, but to deny this resemblance has been called impious and atheistical.

The charge has been alledged too against writers who, like Archbishop King, assert in the strongest terms their belief in the superior excellence of the divine nature, and who call







with the same confidence that we do from those qualities in ourselves, as if the words were expressive of the *same determinate notion* which we annex to them when speaking of ourselves. Even in our own nature we have very imperfect ideas of these qualities. They appear often to interfere with one another, and opinions differ as to the occasions in which each ought to prevail. Nothing indeed is more common in criticism than the remark, that if one virtuous quality be much heightened, it must be at

the expense of another; and that a perfect mixture not only never existed, but that it cannot even be described or represented. But of this we are sure, that whatever is really valuable or excellent in ourselves, exists in an infinite degree of excellence in God; and it is only in so far as - we have any thing good in us, that we venture to transfer and appropriate to his nature the language proper to our own.

That, such is the cause of the jealousy expressed by many on this subject, is rendered more probable by



observing what takes place in the comparison of ourselves with, the lower animals. We make no scruple to call their parts and passions by the same names with our own—but an unwillingness is often observable among men to bestow upon any of their qualities the titles *intellectual and moral*, or to speak of their reason, knowledge, fidelity, gratitude, and the like (although the analogy is often as close as these, instances as in the other, and men are continually driven in spite of their





*literally* of a being who does not literally bear the same relation to us, which we bear to one another. They are understood to denote only that we are to expect from God that treatment which we should experience from a just, kind, generous and prudent person—and that too in a degree much more eminent and perfect, than ever can be experienced from men. And further, when he is represented as our King, our Master, our Father, the meaning is, that all that is right and estimable in those relations *will* on his



employed to solve the difficulty which is raised about the *fore-knowledge* of God being consistent with the *free-will* and the *probation* of his creatures, and thus to overthrow the favourite position of Calvinism. It is to this purpose alone that Archbishop King applies it—and to oppose this purpose it is that Edwards raises the clamour about the moral attributes, as if *their* nature also must be held to be different in kind from human virtues, if the *knowledge* of God be admitted to be different in

kind from ours.

Yet if the *nature* of God be essentially different from that of man, does it not seem reasonable and consistent to suppose that what we call *knowledge* in God must in many respects be different also? For an answer to this question I may refer to one of the most peremptory assertors of the doctrine of absolute Predestination, that has ever appeared in this or in any former age.

'Properly speaking,' says Toplady, 'it cannot be affirmed of God that he either did know, or that he





thousand years are as one day, and one day as a thousand years. And even this declaration, magnificent as it is, falls infinitely short of the mark. When therefore I speak of *fore-knowledge* as an attribute essential to Deity, I speak, as St. Paul says, after the manner of men. The simple term *knowledge* would be more intrinsically proper; but then it would not so readily aid the conceptions of ordinary persons. Though, for my own part, I would always rather call the divine knowledge *omniscience*,

than give it any other name.' [*Christian and Philosophy: Necessity Asserted, c. v.*]

That a writer who thus clearly admits the nature of God, in a point so essential, to be widely different from that of man, should yet think himself entitled to reason upon that nature, and draw inferences from his *knowledge*, his *will*, his *happiness*, with the same boldness and confidence that he does when applying these terms to a creature, is to me unaccountable. But so it is. This very writer proceeds in the same



'Who art thou, O man, that  
replieth against God?'

From vainly supposing  
that when we have affixed a  
*name* we have acquired a  
notion as determinate to  
our understanding, as the  
form or the sound of the  
letters is to our senses, men  
are betrayed into this rash  
and dogmatical mode of  
reasoning. The danger of  
indulging it is much greater  
than those who introduced  
it at first suspected.  
Edwards, who argues  
against Archbishop King's  
explanation with so much  
apparent zeal for religion,



Of the evil of applying this method of argumentation to matters of religion, his own tract furnishes a sufficient example. 'Do we not, he says, from the *justice* of God conclude that he will deal with every man according to his merit? Do we not from the same attribute conclude the *necessity* of an incarnate God suffering for the sins of the world? Do we not conclude from his *goodness* his design to save mankind?'

If this be the use we are to make of our *determinate ideas* of God's attributes,















which appear to flow from them, we quit the true, the revealed God, and betake ourselves to the idols of our own brain. To Archbishop King we owe that analysis of the error which not only satisfies the understanding that it is an error, but enables us to point out to others where it lies. But in Luther, in Cranmer, in Ridley, in all the great restorers of religious truth in our own country we recognize the same sentiment, that to attempt to know God otherwise than as revealed in Scripture, is a vain, a

fruitless, a dangerous undertaking. The words of that blessed martyr *[Ridley. See Martyr's Letters, p. 65.]*

before quoted, cannot be too firmly engraven in the bosom of every Christian.

In these matters I am so fearful, that I dare not speak farther, yea almost none otherwise, than the text doth, as it were, lead me by the hand.

P. 89. *Not in their power to avoid]*

In the furtherance of







influenced and guided by him, is to weaken the impression made by these very cases. And to conclude from such passages of Scripture, that the *eternal condition* of each individual must also be predetermined and appointed, is still more illogical and inconsistent.

Upon this subject, see some excellent remarks in Sumner's Apostolical Preaching, [*Chap. 2*] a work which has thrown much new light upon all the points connected with the question of Predestination.





## DISCOURSE 4:

LUKE 13:23, 24.

THEN SAID ONE UNTO HIM, LORD, ARE THERE FEW THAT BE SAVED? AND HE SAID UNTO THEM, STRIVE TO ENTER IN AT THE STRAIT GATE: FOR MANY, I SAY UNTO YOU, WILL SEEK TO ENTER IN, AND SHALL NOT BE ABLE.

THIS memorable passage opens a wide field for reflection and enquiry. The question proposed to our Lord is one which might







same exhortation, namely, to be mindful of their own duty, and to leave the rest to God.

'They asked him, saying, Lord, wilt thou at this time restore again the kingdom to Israel? And he said unto them, It is not for you to know the times and the seasons which the Father hath put in his own power—but ye shall receive power after that the Holy Ghost is come upon you; and ye shall be witnesses unto me both in Jerusalem, and in all Judea, and in Samaria, and unto the uttermost parts of the



earth.'

In strict harmony with this general tenor of his discourses, I would interpret the passage before us. *[Acts 1:6-8]*

'Trouble not yourself about these matters which it is neither your business nor your interest to know. Enough employment you will have in working out your own salvation. Exert your best endeavours in the pursuit of that object, for it is no light or easy matter. It will give you ample scope for the exercise of all your faculties and all your time. The difficulties are greater





Ask the thousands of those careless livers who swarm in the world whether they ever built their hopes of salvation upon such a basis—they will instantly reject the idea as absurd and impossible. These then cannot be the description of persons whom our Lord meant when he said, that many shall seek to enter in and shall not be able. There must be something more than this intended—some error more seducing and much more widely spread among men to account for the awful warning, that multitudes will be











of divine Providence in the constitution of things, but is at variance also with the express language of Scripture. ‘Blessed are the meek, for they shall possess the earth [*Matt. 5:5.*].’ ‘Godliness,’ St. Paul observes, ‘hath the promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come [*1 Tim. 4:8.*].’ Which sentiment is inculcated by St. Peter with a kind of appeal to our experience in confirmation of its truth, ‘Who is he that will harm you if ye be followers of that which is good [*1 Pet. 3:13.*]?’































the praise for having called him out of darkness into his marvellous light. No man cometh to me,' said our Lord, except my Father draw him.' To God then be our thanks and praise rendered, as the giver not only of our natural but of our spiritual life. He is, as our Church often confesses, the Author of all godliness. 'Of his own will begat he us with the word of truth [*Jam. 1:18*]' It is God that worketh in us both to will and to do of his good pleasure.' [*Phil. 2:13*]. His grace brought us to the knowledge of the truth, and











that by any means, when I have preached to others, I myself should be a castaway.' [1Cor. 9:27]

It is in this point of view that the Calvinistic doctrine appears to be most dangerous, and most at variance with the example of apostolical teaching. They continually represent election in Christ as a reason why the true Christian is zealous of good works. Undoubtedly it is a reason, and a powerful one—but the apostles take pains to represent it as a reason not why he is so, but



are bought with a price,  
*therefore* glorify God in  
your body, and in your  
spirit, which are God's  
[1Cor. 5:19].'

And so with regard not  
only to moral duties, but to  
their continuance in the  
faith, St. Paul never ceases  
to speak of their election,  
not as having finally settled  
their doom, but as an  
urgent motive for  
continuing steadfast in the  
faith.

To the Hebrews he says,  
'Let us hold fast the  
profession of our faith  
without wavering, (for he is  
faithful that hath































powers and with a sense of right and wrong. Whatever grounds there may be in nature for this philosophical creed, and whatever difficulty there may be in refuting it by direct argument, the same grounds and the same difficulty (precisely the same and no other) will be found to lie in Scripture, and are produced in behalf of Calvinism. The analogy between natural and revealed religion is in this case, as in most others, strict and conclusive—so that according to the admirable argument of





















be assured it is spacious enough for the passage of all those whom you will ever persuade to bend their steps towards it. And should any weak or presumptuous disciple propose to you the question, 'Are there few that be saved?' your answer is ready. It is furnished by our Lord himself, and it ought for ever to silence such vain enquiries.

The number of those that shall be saved may indeed be comparatively few—but we know assuredly, that it was a countless multitude













general way to their being called to the knowledge of God. Neither is the doctrine of personal election traced in the Epistle to the Hebrews. *They* had always prided themselves too much on their *national* privileges—and he does *not* tell them that they are *individually* chosen to salvation out of the wreck of their countrymen, by God's eternal decree, as it is reasonable to believe he would have done, if it had been either true in fact, or important in doctrine.

Thus far I have abridged the author's statement:





destruction of Jerusalem:  
and in the writings of the  
fathers we find little  
authority for the doctrine,  
and not a single passage  
which is not reconcileable  
with that interpretation of  
St. Paul for which I have  
contended.'

*P. 170. Go not forth to  
fight the Lord's battles,&c]*  
Numberless are the  
passages in Luther's works  
which earnestly inculcate  
this principle. 'In his  
persevera, tanquam murus  
aheneus, nihil aliud  
inculcari tibi sinens, quam  
quo modo se ipse ostendit



*et manifestat per verbum Christi. [Vol 5 p. 197.]* Tu habes Evangelium, es baptizatus, habes absolutionem, es Christianus, et tamen *dubitas ? ..... Deus dicit tibi* “ En habes filium meum, hunc audias et acceptes. Id si facis, jam *certus* es de fide et salute tua” . . . . Omittendae sunt disputationes, et dicendum, *Ego sum Christianus .... Dedit tibi firmissima argumenta certitudinis et veritatis suae. Dedit Filium in carnem et mortem, instituit sacramenta, ut scias eum*









# APPENDIX: ON THE SEVENTEENTH ARTICLE OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND.

WHATEVER the true or the scriptural doctrine may be respecting Predestination and Election, it is still incumbent on the Members of the Church of England to prove that their opinions on these points are conformable to the Articles of Faith to which they have subscribed. The enquiry *then* becomes different in kind from that hitherto











Calvinistic doctrine of decrees was not Scriptural—that Christ died for all men—that predestination relates only to the plan of redemption through Christ—that we have no concern with any purpose or decree of the Almighty, except as far as Christ is the subject of it, by whom, whosoever with true and lively faith believeth in him, will certainly be saved. Melanchthon, in particular allusion to Calvin's doctrine of decrees, calls him the *Zeno* of his time, and thus expresses himself upon the occasion of Bolsec's



completed his compilation of the Articles, about which he had corresponded on the most friendly terms with Melancthon.

Cranmer's own opinions are distinctly delivered in the Necessary Doctrine and Erudition for any Christian Man,' published in 1543; from which work the following passage, which has often been quoted, will suffice for our present purpose.

'All men be also to be monished, and chiefly preachers, that in this highe mater, they lokinge











of the Augsburg Confession, drawn up by Melancthon in 1530, and with various parts of his Loci Theologici, and other works.

The Confession of Wirtemberg, which was composed in 1551, is merely a repetition in substance and a revision of that of Augsburg. The agreement, in point of diction as well as doctrine, between these two Confessions and our own Articles is prominent and undisguised. Some of the most remarkable instances may be seen in





The Saxon Confession also, which, as well as the Wirtemberg, is founded upon that of Augsburg, and which was published in 1551, speaks yet more plainly to the same purpose.

'Non addimus hic quaestiones de praedestinatione seu de electione; sed deducimus omnes lectores ad verbum Dei, et jubemus ut voluntatem Dei ex verbo ipsius discant, sicut Aeternus Pater expressa voce praecipit, *Hunc audite*. Non quaerant alias speculationes.' Art. *De Remissione Peccatarum, et*



Theologici. Luther, who had in his early life maintained the same opinions, after the controversy with Erasmus about free-will never taught them; and although he did not, with the candour of Melanchthon, openly retract what he had once written, yet he bestowed the highest commendations on the last editions of Melanchthon's work, containing this correction. He also scrupled not to assert publicly, that at the beginning of the Reformation his creed was not completely settled: and









advanced in the knowledge of the Scriptures, was by degrees abandoned; and a doctrine more truly Scriptural succeeded, that of predestination through Christ of all those who should build their faith on him. The proofs of this change in Melancthon's writings are innumerable: but there is one passage more remarkable than the rest, which occurs in a letter of his to Cranmer, in 1548, because it not only shews how thoroughly he disapproved the opinions formerly maintained on these points, but there is





have enlarged in the foregoing discourses: and a repetition of those discussions would not only be needless, but irrelevant in this place.

It cannot however fail to be observed, as characteristic marks of the respective schools, that Calvin is bold, precise, and peremptory, while the others are cautious and diffident in their language—'fearful,' according to the words of Ridley, 'to go farther than the text doth as it were lead them by the hand.' They seem to be aware also, that

on subjects of this nature only a *partial* disclosure of the truth can be expected. If we cannot adequately comprehend the nature of God, if *time* and *succession of events* are ideas proper only to ourselves, and not applicable to him, how can we presume to speculate and argue upon his *antecedent* will and his *consequent* will, his *foreknowledge*, his purpose, and decrees? What he has thought fit to reveal, we receive with alacrity and thankfulness, but more than that we presume not, by way of











of mankind, and to bring them by Christ to everlasting salvation, as vessels made to honour. Wherefore, they which be endued with so excellent a benefit of God he called according to God's purpose by his Spirit working in due season: they through grace obey the calling: they be justified freely: they be made sons of GOD BY adoption: they be made like the image of

*[The only begotten Jesus Christ. Ed. of 1552.]*

his only begotten Son Jesus Christ: they walk religiously in good works,

and at length by God's mercy, they attain to everlasting felicity.

As the godly consideration of Predestination, and our Election in Christ, is full of sweet, pleasant, and unspeakable comfort to godly persons, and such as feel in themselves the working of the Spirit of Christ, mortifying the works of the flesh, and their earthly members, and drawing up their mind to high and heavenly things, as well because it doth greatly establish and confirm *their* faith of

eternal salvation to be enjoyed through Christ, as because it doth fervently kindle *their* love towards God: So, for curious and carnal persons, lacking the Spirit of Christ, to have continually before their eyes the sentence of God's Predestination, is a most dangerous downfall, whereby the Devil doth thrust them either into desperation, or into wretchlessness of most unclean living, no less perilous than desperation.

'Furthermore

*[After 'furthermore' the following words were in*















*elected* to eternal life. Although they might acknowledge that God was the sole author and arbiter of this dispensation, as he is of all that happens in the material world, yet they did not allow, that every single act was decreed and rendered necessary by him in the one case more than in the other: and in the language they employ on this unfathomable question, they are careful not to leave that impression upon the mind. In this caution the English Reformers imitated their example. 'De electione,'









lectoribus praeteritus.' Loci  
Theol. fol. 258,

Again, Ita hominibus  
*curiosis*, carnalibus, et  
spiritu Christi destitutis, ob  
oculos perpetuo versari  
praedestinationis Dei  
sententiam,

**perniciosissimum** est  
*praecipitium*, unde illos  
diabolus protrudit, vel in  
desperationem, vel in aequi  
perniciosam *impurissimae*  
*vita securitatem.*]

*[Securitatem.*

*Recklessness. The use of  
the word wretch- less Dr.  
Johnson calls an  
unaccountable corruption*













*promissio*, qua gratiam bonis, malis, parvis, magnis, frigidis, calidis, aridis et viridibus offert; non est *arctanda* ad illos, qui, talaribus stolis induti, pii et sancti esse volunt.' Seckendorf, vol. i. lib. 2. sect. 43. §. 5.

Quod autem Christum non omnes accipiunt *ipsorum culpa fit*, quod non credunt, et indulgent diffidentiae suae. Interim manet *sententia Dei et promissio universalis*, quod Deus omnes homines vult salvos esse.' Op. iv. p. 441.

In Melanchthon's works





whole chapter on  
Predestination in his Loci  
Theologici might be  
transcribed as evidence of  
these opinions.

‘Duo autem sunt  
consideranda in  
promissione Evangelii,  
videlicet, quod et *promittit  
justitiam, et quod promissio  
est universalis* Ideo neque  
dignitatem nostram  
respicere debemus, *neque  
ex uni- versali promissione  
efficere.*

Sed singuli nos in illam  
universalem includamus.  
Cum igitur de electione  
angimur aut disputamus,  
*non ordimur a nostris*

*supputationibus*, vel a lege,  
sed a promissione  
Evangelii.' Loc. Theol. de  
Praedest. ed. 1535.

'Ut praedicatio pœnitentiae  
universalis est,

et omnefe arguit, ut Rom.  
iii. clare dicitur; ita et

*promissio gratia est*  
*universalis*, ut multa dicta  
testantur....Removeamus

igitur a Paulo Stoicas  
disputationes, quae fidem  
et invocationem evertunt

...Adversus has

imaginatioes discamus vo-  
luntatem Dei ex Evangelio,

agnoscamus promissionem  
esse *universalem*, ut fides

et invocatio accendi possit.'







blood.' Ephes. 1:7.

'That he might gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven, and which are on earth, even in him: in whom also we have obtained an inheritance, being predestinated according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will.' Ephes. 1:10.

'And that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which he had before prepared unto glory.' Rom. 9:23.

*Called according to God's purpose by his Spirit working in due season. They through grace obey the calling.]*

'We know that all things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are *the* called according to his purpose.' Rom. 8:28. Who hath saved us, and called us with an holy calling, not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus.' 2 Tim. 1:9.

'Elect according to the



foreknowledge of God the Father, *through sanctification of the Spirit unto obedience.*' 1 Pet. 1:2.

*They be justified freely.]*

'Being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus.' Rom. 3:24.

*They be made sons of God by adoption.]*

To redeem them that were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons.' Gal. 4:5.

*They be made like the image of his only-begotten*



Matt. 25:34.

Cranmer's plan was to avoid all abstract speculation about God's decrees, and to teach only *an election in Christ*; and by so doing, he not only adheres closely to the authority of Scripture, but he virtually includes the *terms and conditions* of the Christian covenant under the notion of election. That this principle was not lost sight of or weakened by the resettlers of our Church in Queen Elizabeth's reign, is evident from the very alteration, slight as it is,

which the seventeenth Article underwent at the revision of 1562. For, as if in order to mark this point decisively, in the sentence which before ran 'whom he hath chosen out of mankind,' they introduced the words 'in Christ' after the word 'chosen,' although the context sufficiently implied that such was the meaning of the first compiler. The fact however is material, as an argument against those writers who pretend that the Reformers of 1562 were more Calvinistic than those of Edward the Sixth's reign.

The Articles were not published in English till 1571. In this translation Dr. Laurence has justly remarked on a deviation from the original which, though probably undesigned and not very important, yet, as far as it goes, weakens the anti-calvinistic character of the seventeenth Article. The words '*fidem nostrum*' and '*amorem nostrum*,' are translated '*their* faith' and '*their* love.' Whereas, he observes, the pronoun *noster* seems not to have been adventitiously adopted, the use of it being

to impress the Lutheran idea of election, not as individuals but as *Christ*, in a character common to us all, and one to which alone confidence in eternal salvation is attached.

'Qui de hoc (viz. de praedestinatione) dubitat,' remarks Bucer in his explanation of Melancthon's doctrine, 'nequit esse Christianus. Praesumendum igitur, ut principium fidei, *nos omnes* a Deo esse praescitos, praefinitos, separates a reliquis, et selectos in hoc, ut aeternum servemur, hocque propositum Dei



runs in English, 'As the  
godly consideration of  
*predestination and our  
election in Christ* ;  
separating from  
*predestination*, (which it  
thus represents as relating  
*generally* to the purpose of  
redemption by Christ,) and  
adding it to *election* which  
by the very meaning of the  
term is necessarily applied  
to *individuals*.

The force of this  
distinction, which the  
English translation has  
made apparent, is clearly in  
favour of the Lutheran  
construction: but I am  
inclined to think it has been















utterly beyond the limit of our faculties, but for all practical purposes it teaches us to consider the subject as St. Paul has done [*Rom. 8:29*], in an intelligible order—*God's purpose being founded on his foreknowledge*, (not as Calvin boldly asserts, his foreknowledge being the consequence of his own decree,) and man's acceptance of the promised redemption being left to his own choice.

In this explanation no farther difficulty is involved, than what belongs equally to the





some more explicit declaration from authority upon these points.

'During this period,' says Dr. Winchester, the Calvinists were so little satisfied, that our Articles came up to their doctrines, that they were frequently calling for additions to them, to make them speak agreeably to their minds.' In Queen Elizabeth's reign indeed the question was fairly brought to an issue. Archbishop Whitgift was induced in 1595 by a party of Cambridge divines to put forth under his own authority, supported by the

opinions of a few others whom he had assembled at Lambeth for that purpose, a series of articles explanatory of the disputed points. For this offence he was sharply reprimanded and threatened with punishment by the Queen; who however at length accepted his apology, that they were not intended as a standing rule to direct the Church, but merely as answers to certain questions which had been warmly disputed at Cambridge, sent with a view to compose the differences in that



predestinated certain men unto life ; certain men he hath reprobated.

2. The moving or efficient cause of predestination unto life, is not the foresight of faith, or of perseverance, or of good works, or of any thing that is in the person predestinated, but only the good-will and pleasure of God.

3. There is predetermined a certain number of the predestinate, which can neither be augmented nor diminished.

4. Those who are not predestinated to salvation

shall be necessarily damned for their sins.

5. A true, living, and justifying faith, and the Spirit of God justifying, is not extinguished, falleth not away, vanisheth not away in the elect, either totally or finally.

6. A man truly faithful, that is, such a one who is endued with a justifying faith, is certain, with the full assurance of faith, of the remission of his sins, and of his everlasting salvation by Christ.

7. Saving grace is not given, is not granted, is not communicated to all men,



Quinquarticular History,  
part 1. c. 6. sect. 7.

**Art. 1. *Of Divine  
Predestination.***

That God, by an absolute decree, hath elected to salvation a very small number of men, without any regard to their faith or obedience whatsoever; and secluded from saving grace all the rest of mankind, and appointed them by the same decree to eternal damnation, without any regard to their infidelity or impenitency.

**Art. 2. *Of the Merit and***

## *Effect of Christ's Death.*

That Jesus Christ hath not suffered death for any other, but for those elect only; having neither had any intent nor commandment of his Father, to make satisfaction for the sins of the whole world.

## *Art. 3. Of Mans Will in the state of Nature.*

That by Adam's fall his posterity lost their free-will, being put to an unavoidable necessity to do, or not to do, whatsoever they do, or do not, whether



it be good or evil; being thereunto predestinated by the eternal and effectual secret decree of God.

### **Art. 4. *Of the Manner of Conversion.***

That God, to save his elect from the corrupt mass, doth beget faith in them by a power equal to that whereby he created the world, and raised up the dead; insomuch, that such, unto whom he gives that grace, cannot reject it, and the rest, being reprobate, cannot accept it.

**Art. 5. *Of the***

# *Certainty of Perseverance.*

That such as have once received that grace by faith, can never fall from it finally or totally, notwithstanding the most enormous sins they can commit.

object of the argument pursued in these discourses, that the cautious language of our Church is not the result of an *equivocal and compromising policy*, studious to include discordant sects under a nominal conformity of doctrine, as it has been sometimes represented



religion—and that reason is not *shocked*, however it may be *humbled*, by any exposition of the contested propositions, except by that which asserts one of them to the exclusion of the other.

THE END.

BAXTER, PRINTER,  
OXFORD.

*Albemarle-Street, London,*  
NOVEMBER, 1821.

WORKS LATELY  
PUBLISHED.  
SOLD BY ALL  
BOOKSELLERS.

MEMOIRS OF THE LIFE  
OF THE RIGHT  
HONOURABLE WILLIAM  
PITT.

By GEORGE TOMLINE,  
D.D., BISHOP OF  
WINCHESTER. THIRD  
EDITION. 3 Vols. 8vo. 38s.

A VOYAGE FOR THE  
DISCOVERY OF A  
NORTH-WEST PASSAGE

FROM THE ATLANTIC TO  
THE PACIFIC,  
Performed by His Majesty's  
Ships HECLA and GRIPER,  
under the Orders of  
CAPTAIN PARRY. SECOND  
EDITION. 3l.13s. 6d.  
In 4to., illustrated by  
numerous Charts, and a  
great many interesting  
Plates.

*By Authority of the Lords  
Commissioners of the  
Admiralty.*

The NORTH GEORGIA  
GAZETTE and WINTER  
CHRONICLE.

A Newspaper that was  
established on board the

Ships employed in the  
Discovery of a North-West  
Passage, Edited By Captain  
EDWARD SABINE, R.A.  
4to. 10s. 6d.

A NARRATIVE OF  
TRAVELS IN NORTHERN  
AFRICA, FROM TRIPOLI  
TO MOURZOUK,  
The Capital of FEZZAN;  
and from thence to the  
Southern Extremity of that  
Kingdom, in the Years  
1818, 19, and 20 ;  
accompanied by  
Geographical Notices of  
SOUDAN, and of the  
Course of the NIGER. With  
a Chart of the Routes, and a

great variety of coloured  
Plates, illustrative of the  
Costumes of the several  
Natives of Northern Africa.  
By CAPTAIN LYON, R. N.,  
Companion to the late Mr.  
RITCHIE.

With numerous Coloured  
Plates, Maps, &c. 4to. 31.  
3s.

NARRATIVE OF THE  
OPERATIONS AND  
RECENT DISCOVERIES  
WITHIN THE PYRAMIDS,  
TEMPLES, TOMBS, AND  
EXCAVATIONS IN EGYPT  
AND NUBIA,

And of a Journey to the



Coast of the RED SEA, in  
search of the ancient  
Berenice, and another to  
the Oasis of Jupiter  
Ammon. By G. BELZONI.  
With a Portrait. SECOND  
EDITION ; to which are now  
added an Appendix and a  
Map, 4to. 21. 5s.

FORTY-FOUR LARGE  
PLATES,  
All coloured, to illustrate  
the OPERATIONS OF  
BELZONI in Egypt and  
Nubia. Atlas folio, 6l. 6s.  
(sold separately).  
The Purchasers of the First  
Edition may have the  
APPENDIX, containing an

Explanation of the  
principal Hieroglyphics, 4e.  
and Remarks on Mr.  
Belzoni's Plates, together  
with a Map. 4to. 5s.

THE TOPOGRAPHY OF  
ATHENS,  
With some Remarks on its  
Antiquities. By Lieut -Col.  
LEAKE. With Maps and  
Plates; the latter from the  
Drawings of C. COCKERELL,  
Esq. 8vo. 1l.10s.

THE DOGE OF VENICE,  
AN HISTORICAL TRAGEDY, in  
Five Acts, with a Preface,  
Notes, and an Appendix of  
Original Documents; and  
THE PROPHECY OF  
DANTE.

By the Right Hon. LORD  
BYRON. Octavo, 12s.

LETTER ON THE REV. W.  
L. BOWLES' STRICTURES  
ON THE LIFE AND  
WRITINGS OF POPE.

By the Right Hon. LORD  
BYRON. THIRD EDITION.  
8vo. 3s. 6d

MEMOIRS BY JAMES

EARL WALDEGRAVE, K.  
G.

One of His Majesty's Privy  
Council in the reign of  
George II., and Governor of  
George III., when Prince of  
Wales; being a short  
account of political  
contentions, party quarrels,  
and events of consequence,  
from 1764 to 1767. With a  
Portrait. One vol. small 4to.  
1l. 6s.

A COPIOUS GREEK  
GRAMMAR.

By AUGUSTUS  
MATTHIAS,

Translated from the  
German, by the late Rev. E.

V. BLOMFIELD, M.A., Fellow  
of Emanuel College,  
Cambridge. A NEW  
EDITION. 2 Vols. 8vo. 30s.

ELEMENTARY  
ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE  
CELESTIAL MECHANICS  
OF LAPLACE

Comprehending the First  
Book; with an Introduction,  
containing the Rudiments  
of the Mathematics; being  
the First Part of a Work  
intended to supply the  
Student with every Link  
that is actually required for  
a complete Chain of  
Demonstration, extending  
to the whole Theory of

Planetary Motions. 8vo.  
10s. 6d

THE DRAMATIC WORKS  
OF THE RIGHT HON. R.  
B. SHERIDAN,  
Now first collected, and  
edited, with a Preface. In  
Two Vols. Octavo. 28s. By  
THOMAS MOORE, Esq.

NARRATIVE OF THE  
CHINESE EMBASSY,  
From the Emperor of  
China, *Kang Hes*, to the  
Khan of Tourgouth Tartars,  
seated on the banks of the  
Volga, in the years 1712, 13,  
14, and 16. By the Chinese  
Ambassador, and

published by the Emperor's  
authority, at Peking.

Translated from the  
original Chinese.

By Sir GEORGE THOMAS  
STAUNTON, Bart., LL.D.,  
F.R.S.

8vo. With a Map. 18s.

NARRATIVE of the  
CAMPAIGNS of the  
BRITISH ARMY at  
WASHINGTON and NEW  
ORLEANS. 8vo. 12s.

A TREATISE ON NAVAL  
GUNNERY.

Published with the  
approbation and  
permission of the Lords

Commissioners of the  
Admiralty. With Plates,  
8vo. 18s.

By Colonel Sir HOWARD  
DOUGLAS, Bart., K.S.C.,  
C.B., F.R.S.

THE BELVIDERE  
APOLLO. FAZIO, A  
TRAGEDY.  
AND OTHER POEMS.

By the Rev. H. H.  
MILMAN.

(Printed uniformly with  
THE FALL OF JERUSALEM.)

8vo., 8s, 6d.

THE WORKS OF THE  
RIGHT HON. LORD  
BYRON.

A new Edition, beautifully



printed by Davison, and now  
comprised in 5 vols. small  
8vo., and for 35s.

PLATES, including a  
PORTRAIT, to illustrate  
this and former Editions,  
engraved by Heath, from  
Drawings by Westall and  
Stothard, are sold  
separately.

THE LIFE OF WILLIAM  
SANCROFT,  
ARCHBISHOP OF  
CANTERBURY,  
Compiled principally from  
original and scarce  
Documents; with an  
Appendix containing the  
curious Diary of the learned

HENRY WHARTON. Now  
first published from a  
Manuscript in Lambeth  
Palace; also, the remaining  
Works, now scarce, of  
Archbishop SANCROFT. With  
a Portrait, from an original  
Picture, by LUTTRELL, In  
Lambeth Palace. 2 vols. 8vo.

24s.

By the Rev. GEORGE  
D'OYLY, D.D., F.R.S.,  
Late Domestic Chaplain to  
his Grace the Archbishop of  
Canterbury.

REJECTED ADDRESSES.  
SEVENTEENTH EDITION,  
corrected and revised. In  
Small Octavo. 5s. 6d.

HISTORICAL MEMOIRS  
OF THE ENGLISH, IRISH,  
AND SCOTTISH  
CATHOLICS.

By CHARLES BUTLER,  
Esq. Vols. III. and IV. 8vo.  
30s.

AN INQUIRY INTO THE  
DOCTRINES OF  
NECESSITY AND  
PREDESTINATION,  
In Four Discourses,  
preached before the  
University of Oxford. With  
an Appendix on the  
Seventeenth Article of the  
Church of England.  
By EDWARD COPLESTON,

D. D.

Provost of Oriel College,  
Oxford, and Prebendary of  
Rochester. 8vo. 7s. 6d.

ARCHBISHOP KING'S  
SERMON ON  
PREDESTINATION,  
A New Edition, With Notes,  
By the Rev. R. WHATLEY,  
Fellow of Oriel. Octavo. 5s.  
6d.

NOTES ON THE CAPE OF  
GOOD HOPE,

Made during an Excursion  
through the principal parts  
of that Colony in the year  
1820. In which are briefly  
considered the advantages  
and disadvantages it offers

to the English Emigrant;  
with some Remarks upon  
the New Settlement at Algoa  
Bay. Cr. 8vo. 7s. 6d

THE DESTINATION AND  
USE OF WORKS OF ART  
Considered with regard to  
their Influence on the  
Genius and Taste of Artists,  
or Judges, and the  
Sentiment of those who feel  
and enjoy them. Translated  
from the French by HENRY  
THOMSON, R. A. fc. 8vo.  
3s.6d.

A MANUAL OF  
CHEMISTRY,  
Containing the Principal

Facts of the Science,  
arranged in the Order in  
which they are discussed  
and illustrated in the  
Lectures at the Royal  
Institution. NEW EDITION,  
considerably enlarged and  
improved, with numerous  
Plates, Wood-Cuts,  
Diagrams, &c. 3 vols. 8vo.  
2l. 5s.

By W. T. BRANDE,  
Secretary to the Royal  
Society, Professor of  
Chemistry at the Royal  
Institution, &c. &c. &c.  
ON THE PRINCIPLES OF  
POLITICAL ECONOMY  
AND TAXATION.

By DAVID RICARDO, M. P.

A THIRD EDITION,  
corrected. Octavo. 12s.

KNICKERBOCKER'S  
(Author of THE SKETCH  
BOOK) HUMOROUS  
ACCOUNT OF NEW  
YORK,

From the Beginning of the  
World to the End of the  
Dutch Dynasty; containing,  
among many surprising  
and curious Matters, the  
unutterable Ponderings of  
WALTER the DOUBTER, the  
disasterous Projects of  
WILLIAM the TESTY, and the  
chivalric Achievements of  
PETER the HEADSTRONG,  
the Three Dutch Governors

of New Amsterdam; being  
the only authentic History  
of the Times that ever hath  
been published.

NEW EDITION, uniform with  
the Sketch Book. 2 Vols.  
post 8vo. 12s.

SKETCH BOOK OF  
GEOFFREY CRAYON.

FIFTH EDITION. 2 Vols. post  
8vo. 16s.

AN AUTUMN NEAR THE  
RHINE;

Or, SKETCHES of  
COURTS, SOCIETY, and  
SCENERY in GERMANY,  
near the RHINE. Second  
Edition. To which are now  
added, an Account of a



Tour in die Tamms  
Mountains, in the Year  
1820, and some  
Translations from the  
Poems of Schiller and  
Goethe. With a Plate. 8vo.  
14s.

THE POEMS OF CAIUS  
VALERIUS CATULLUS,  
2 vols. fc. 8vo. Translated,  
with a Preface and Notes,  
By the Honourable  
GEORGE LAMB. 12s.

MEMOIRS OF THE  
CARBONARI AND OF  
THE SECRET SOCIETIES  
OF THE SOUTH OF  
ITALY;

With Biographical Memoirs  
of several Persons who  
have lately distinguished  
themselves in the  
Revolutions of that  
Kingdom. With an  
Appendix of original  
Documents.

Illustrated with Portraits,  
and other interesting  
Plates. 8vo. 12s.

TABLES TO BE USED  
WITH THE NAUTICAL  
ALMANAC FOR FINDING  
THE LATITUDE AND  
LONGITUDE AT SEA;

With easy and accurate  
Methods of performing the  
Computations required for

these purposes. 8vo. 21s.  
By the Rev. W. LAX, A.M.,  
F.R.S.,  
Lowndes' Professor of  
Astronomy and Geometry  
in the University of  
Cambridge. RELIGIO  
CLERICI;  
Two Epistles by a  
Churchman. With Notes. A  
New Edition. To which is  
now added, by the same  
Author,  
A PARSON'S CHOICE OF  
TOWN OR COUNTRY;  
An Epistle to a Young  
Divine. 7s. 6d.

THE MONKS AND THE  
GIANTS:

*SPECIMEN OF AN  
INTENDED NATIONAL  
WORK,*  
By WILLIAM and ROBERT  
WHISTLECRAFT.  
FOURTH EDITION. 4s. 6d.



DATE ISSUED

DATE DUE

DATE ISSUED

DATE DUE

SEP 23 - OCT 7 - '50

OCT 14 NOV 11 '62

DEC 8 JAN 5 - '63